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The world economy registered within the last decades a series of transformations which had as a result 
astounding economic growth, yet also violent crises, a maturing of the international cooperation with 
positive effects, yet also negative aspects as a consequence of interconnections that allowed the external 
transfer of economic unbalances. Under the pressure of globalization, internationalization and increasing 
complexity of the markets, the future of the International Financial Institutions – IFIs and their role appear 
as a challenge to change, yet they also raise a series of questions on the reasons of their existence. We try 
to  explain  the  present  system  of  international  financial  institutions  and  debate  upon  several  ideas 
regarding the future thereof. At the same time, the study emphasizes controversies on the manner said 
system managed to get involved and solve the problems of the world economy.     
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Within a world economy of globalization, internationalization and increasing complexity of the 
markets,  yet  of  periods  marked  by  crises  as  the  recent  one,  the  future  of  the  International 
Financial Institutions – IFIs and the role thereof appear as a challenge to change, yet they also 
raise a series of questions on the reasons of their existence. Said aspects represented points of 
interest for many economists and politicians. Some of them limited themselves to carrying out 
assessments on the achievements of said institutions, others went further trying to draw the lines 
of their evolution.  
In Europe, the speed of European economic integration, the carrying out of the unique market by 
gradually  eliminating  intra-European  barriers  in  performing  financial  services  also  raised  a 
question on the role of the European credit institutions in the future and on the way they may 
generally bring added value.  
Except  for  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development,  IFIs  were  created  the 
moment there was a control on the international capital flows and when the financing of the les 
developed countries was limited. A characteristic of the last decades was the globalization and 
internationalization of the capital markets. At the beginning of the 1980s, an increase of the 
capital flows towards the emergent markets started to manifest, on the grounds of recycling the 
incomes from oil. Yet this presented a slowing down due to the crises of debts in 1982. After a 
period of macroeconomic stabilization, the private capital flows “exploded” at the beginning of 
the  1990s,  when  direct  foreign  investments  portfolio  investments  and  non-banking  credits 
represented the main source of funds for developing the world countries. Given this evolution, 
after year 2000, the IFIs loans decreased as percentage on market to only a few percentages of the 
total capital flows, given almost 40% in 1990, thus resulting a reducing of the importance thereof.  
In this context we may say that the IFIs share becomes more and more subjective as crediting 
orientates itself more to the private sector and financial integration is larger. The logic of the IFIs 
interference  and,  in  connection  thereof,  the  role  of  said  institutions  are  questioned  by  the 
economic  globalization  and  the  increase  of  private  sector  role  as  vehicle  of  the  economic 
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The IFIs traditional operating way demonstrates that said institutions were the favorite creditors 
of  the  world  governments,  special  intermediates  of  the  capital  flows,  of  saving  from  richer 
countries to the investors in the poor countries, the IFIs traditional model being that of attracting 
funds  from  the  international  capital  markets  such as  to lend  them  to  governments. The  IFIs 
characteristic  feature  is  given  by  their  multilateral  nature,  that  is  the  occurring  errors  have 
repercussions  on  any  other  stockholder  states,  this  representing  a  bigger  obstacle  than  the 
bilateral problems which may occur from a private relationship creditor-loaner. On the other 
hand, said institutions present the advantage that the credit risk generally manifests in extreme 
cases.  
In Christopher Hurst and Eric Peree’s opinion, both economists at the European Investment 
Bank, the international environment created a preferred creditor, IFIs, which cannot be duplicated 
by the private sector. For said creditor the cost of providing capital is low, as the probability of 
exerting the guarantees is reduced, that means that IFIs uses its credits on a non—discriminating 
basis, cost-plus. As the market has to take into consideration the political risk, this risk does not 
equally manifest in the case of IFIs. These institutions represent the preferred creditors and may 
offer loans at, or under the market interest, this being valid even in the case of a global capital 
market. If the international capital markets do not manifest a drop, the political risk premium 
correctly reflect the lack of certitude in crediting each country, lack of certitude that occurs due to 
the quality of the economic management. The risk that a govern might not be able to deal with 
the duty service is low in a country that is stable from the macroeconomic point of view, where 
the monetary and fiscal policies are adequate and the capital flows are wisely and correctly 
invested.   Moreover, IFIs credits private projects, which is not the case of providing credit lines 
by  private  creditors.  This  also  determines  the  use  of  funds  in  a  clearly  specified  way,  the 
Institutions’ role manifesting from assessing the project file to offering technical assistance with 
projecting and implementing said project. The cheap financing from IFIs could divert public 
investments from said projects. More than that, the political feature of the packet that comes 
together with the credit changes the nature of investment, such that other countries may also 
benefit of credit (by international auctions for the necessary consumables for carrying out the 
project, by fulfilling minimal requirements regarding the environmental protection, etc.).   
Hurst and Peree characterized IFIs as “funds wholesalers that lack the retail trading network.”  
That means that IFIs has in view large projects, the small ones being extremely expensive and 
ineffective for them. Even if large projects present a convenient return, there cannot be excluded 
small investments that may bring a major contribution to the economic development. The result 
is that IFIs may distort investments from the latter to large projects that require an intensive 
financing. A solution was financing sectorial projects, yet the problem that occurred is that IFIs 
personnel  does  not  poses  the  local  knowledge  necessary  to  successfully  implement  small 
projects. In financing said activities, IFIS assigned the management of the project to the local 
parties or counselors. The expansion of credits to larger and larger projects does not simply mean 
providing credit lines to governments. If IFIs financing did not have an impact on the quality of 
investments and, therefore, on the economic growth, the crediting effect would be harmful.  
Internationalization and globalization of the financial system cannot but have effects on IFIs 
activity and role. While the financial system globalization would reduce the imperfections of the 
market,  the  present  financial  crisis  has  demonstrated  that  the  gregarious  spirit  of  said 
international financial markets continue to determine an increased volatility of the capital flows.  
The financial markets did not manage to anticipate financial crises and, therefore, the flexible 
foreign  crediting  helped  the  support  of  the  ineffective  management  in  different  countries. 
Another  consequence  of  the  gregarious  spirit  is  that  the  countries  may  stand  negative 
consequences, with no connection to their economy.  
Other  economists,  such  as      Jannik    Lindbaek,    former  Executive  Vice  President  at  the  
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Neil  Gregory  from  UK  Overseas  Development  Administration  consider  that,  except  for  the 
traditional action model of IFIs as preferential creditor, IFIs also plays an important part under 
the  conditions  of  an  increased  volatility:  the  international  crisis  management  and  allotting 
resources under uncertain conditions.  Said part strongly manifested during the present world 
economic crisis period and gave a new reason for founding such institutions.  
In    general,   the information on the macroeconomic conditions are collected and analyzed by 
independent rating agencies.   The practice demonstrated that the resulted information thereof 
may be altered, imperfect, and in this context IFIs vision on the economic policies plays an 
important part for future prosecutions (especially in case of  IMF).  When having in view a 
financing, IMF bases on said prospections and uses them in establishing the conditioning policy 
applied to the debtor. If IMF does not have enough resources such as to set credit lines into 
action, the task is divided between regional IFIs even if said collaboration is different from the 
financing model of the long term development – the classical IFIs role.  The macroeconomic 
conditioning imposed by IFIs under these circumstances have an important role, being adopted 
by other institutions and represent the grounds that provide the use of funds for carrying out 
adequate reforms, and not an ineffective management.   
Another role that IFIs may further on assume results from increasing loans towards the private 
sector. Many activities considered until now as the natural domain of the state may be more 
effectively carried out by the private sector. Moreover, there appeared as natural within the last 
few years that governs sell on a larger scale the state companies such as to ameliorate the level of 
public  debt.  Said  evolution  also  hints  at  a  more  closely  implication  of  the  private  sector  in 
developing  the  new  infrastructure  by  partnerships  between  public  and  private  sectors.  If  the 
implication of the private sector in the development process appeared recently, its crediting by 
IFIs  started  long  ago.  The  International  Financial  Corporation  and  BIRD  started  even  from 
1960’s to function in this regard and, the other regional institutions also started to support the 
private sector. Certainly, the private sector crediting implies assuming political, commercial risks 
and specific regulating risks for this sector.  
Another aspect of IFIs activity that we would like to emphasize refers to the evolution of the role 
that they have in developing regional capital markets seen both in the sense of obtaining the 
necessary  resources  for  crediting  and,  by  the  intermediating  services  delivered  or  requested 
within regional markets.    
It is well known the fact that the existence of several powerful national financial and banking 
markets represents another key factor in the process of economic development. Numerous studies 
demonstrated that financial development goes hand in hand with economic development, that is 
IFIs treasury and capital market operations  may play a role in development, on condition that 
their actions stimulates the market and lead to a know how transfer to local national institutions. 
IFIs participates into the development of the capital markets first of all by collecting funds within 
larger and larger bond issuing on said markets. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the entire 
development of the capital markets, the share of the issues carried out by IFIs given total Issues 
tends to diminish. 
If we take into account the structure of said bond issues, we may consider that in a world of free 
capital moves and increase of the appetite of investors for investments in a less used currency, 
IFIs also enlarged the set of currencies in which they borrow.  There were cases as the case of the 
Hungarian forint, wherein IFIs initiated the first issuing programs of international markets for 
certain currencies, being the only issuers in that currency. Such pioneering operations created or 
contributed at the consolidation of the developing states markets, with a direct effect on the trust 
in their national currency. Later on, going in the same direction, governs and the private sector 
managed to obtain resources necessary to funding the deficits or development projects.  
We consider that this tendency of taking a loan in the currency of the emergent states   could give 
to IFIs a new role and a new reason for existing for the next few years.  A first observation in this 172 
 
situation is that a loan from IFIs in a particular currency does not automatically mean a know how 
transfer towards that country and a development of the national capital market. The crediting of 
the public sector on international markets is usually carried out in major currencies. The loans in 
new currency are usually changed by swap operations with non-resident investors.  International 
investors may find the titles issued by international financial institutions in the currency of the 
attractive emergent states that are not submitted to a credit risk.  
Another  economist,  Pasquale  Lucio  Scandizzo  professor  at  the  Rome  University  and  former 
President of the Italian Institute of Studies in Economic Planning, approaches another aspect of 
IFIs role.  On his opinion, the increase of crediting the private sector brings IFIs in competition 
with commercial financial institutions. When IFIs credits the private sector offering a large range 
of associated financial services, the competition with the commercial banks becomes obvious. 
Besides  the  facilities  that  come  out  of  an  official  framework,  IFIs  have  a  number  of  other 
advantages including tax exemption, large capitalization and relatively low return required by 
shareholders. The capital payment in IFIs has a cost.  At the same time, the more or les non-profit 
character thereof does not imply the lack of return of their own capital.  The normal approach for 
IFIs is to asses credits as if they were 100 % financed by loan. The return of the own capital is 
linked to the governmental interest rate of the reference countries. This return is lower than the 
return of a private bank. If IFIs are cheaper than other financing sources, it is normal that the 
investors from the private sector look first for IFIs. For the public sector, the total project packet 
and the loan conditioning clearly differentiate IFIs credits from those of the private creditors.  
The  project  assessment  in  case  of  the  private  sector  loans  is  similar  to  the  analysis  of  risk 
assessment in commercial banks.  
Professor Scandizzo establishes two extreme variants of the role of crediting the private sector by 
IFIs.  Said variants are: 
- IFIs should focus on one or two products – in comparison with commercial banks that offer a 
large range of products and the competition will manifest only on a reduced market segment; 
- IFIs should base on the market at the maximum and intervene only when there is no doubt on 
the  need  of  complementarities  of  the  offered  services,  meaning  a  development  of  the 
interventions  in  support  of  the  commercial  banks  sector  (guarantee  schemes,  A  /  B  credits, 
support in credit union trades). 
We think that there are several sensible points in the two proposals. In the first variant it is 
possible that IFIs act in sectors where to present competitive  advantages, given commercial 
banks  and  substitute  them,  and  in  the  second  variant  it  is  not  very  clearly  solved  the 
complementarity problem.  On the market it is ascertained that, together with the increase of the 
capital markets and holding of bank assets, the banks look for future profits especially in the area 
of consulting. In fact, everything that IFIs do with a project of the private sector, including the 
political risk insurance, can be carried out by a private bank as well, yet at a different cost.  Then, 
where  could  we  appreciate  that  the  domains  that  make  that  IFIs  and  commercial  banks 
differentiate mutually trouble themselves and therefore require a compelmentarity in action?  The 
extreme  whereat  IFIs  would  situate  depends  on  the  local  factors  and  the  consensus  of  the 
shareholders on the role of public banks in general.   
An interesting approach of the IFIs role in the future comes from another banker. In his opinion, 
Jean-Francois Rischard, not so long before Prime Vice President for Eurpe at the World Bank, 
considers IFIs multilateral institutions that might play a  leading part in the global public policy, 
defined as policy whereat participation and the effects of its being applied  have an international 
and  multidisciplinary  character.  He  considers  that  the  role  of  the  international  financial 
institutions  might  re-orientate  towards  being  charged  with  supporting  the  participation  of 
developing  countries  to  the  global  public  policy  networks.  This  includes  the  focus  on 
constructing  the  institutions,  promoting  adequate  governance,  spreading  information  and 
establishing a knowledge basis allowing all interested parties to contribute at debating a public 173 
 
policy problem. Rischard ascertains that, taking into account the position they have at present, 
IFIs are in an ideal position for initiating such a policy.  Irrespective from states, private jobbers 
and NGOs, said institutions do not represent private interests. Their mandate is that of promoting 
the integration of world economy in sustainable terms from the social and environmental point of 
view. IFIs could also lead to identifying said problems of public policy that require a global 
engagement  and  could  provide  an  institutional  umbrella  for  the  mediation  between  different 
involved parties. At last, they could assist in monitoring the applying of the global public policy. 
Based on these two roles, IFIs could act besides their original role in the future. IFIs should be 
thought as part of the global public policy network of the future. Within said role, they could 
provide not only financing, yet other categories of services, such as global know how services by 
stressing  the  informal  character  able  to  facilitate  the  operative  access  to  information  or 
partnership global services. 
Far from these considerations, we consider that the traditional model for IFIs remains that of 
institutions  structured  to  finance  large  infrastructure  public  projects.  It  is  not  questionable 
whether  said  model  lost  its  validity,  yet  the  political  and  economic  world  registered  some 
changes. Crediting stressed upon project financing and IFIs progressively delegated projecting 
and  implementing  projects  to third  parties.  It  is  important to notice  the  consolidation  of the 
private sector as development agent and IFIs desire to participate into this process. Whereas 
small steps may be made in this direction, a direct consequence of crediting the private sector and 
competition with commercial banks is that the commercial approach must also be applied to IFIs. 
Conducting this logic to the extreme, some say that IFIs will return back to the traditional model 
and,  others  sustain  that  they  could  orientate  towards  the  private  sector.  A  midline  for  said 
institutions would be their action as agents or subvention donors (grants) that they should provide 
together with the credits. The crisis demonstrated that, even in developed countries, there might 
exist market drops to justify the intervention of the public sector this way.  
IFIs role is that of financing the official development as important part of the external resources 
flows necessary to developing countries. IFIs should support the policy, institutions, necessary 
infrastructure for promoting the economic growth, should protect the environment and encourage 
the private sector.  As countries reach success in their development, their request for IFIs services 
will decrease, due to the fact that said countries will have an easy access to international capital 
market. Except for the last two years, the flows realized by official financial institutions halved as 
share in the long term resources of the developing countries, reflecting the larger access to the 
capital markets of said states and as a smaller request for official assistance in financing public 
sector investments. Yet, private flows are focused to a restricted range of countries, sectors and 
borrowers: 75% of the capital net private flows go to a dozen of countries including the largest 
developing countries, leaving over 100 developing countries with a reduced access to financing. 
Even in that countries receiving a private capital, crediting is limited to certain sectors such as 
extractive industry, infrastructure  and  the financial sector.   The  private  flows  will  not  go to 
education,  health,  etc,  characterized  by  long  gestation  periods  and  low  return.  Therefore, 
although many traditional destinations for the resources of IFIs have access to private financing, 
there  remain  a large  number  of companies, sectors  and  countries that  continue  to  need  IFIs 
implication for financing.  
We consider that IFIs will continue to exist, as financing alternative. Yet, to fulfill their mandate, 
IFIs should continue to offers services in a selective way and become more capable to respond to 
an integrated world, in a continuous change.   
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